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PRAGMATIC DISGORGING OF INSIDER PROFITS:
A REVIEW OF CASES REPORTED UNDER SECTION 16(b)
B. THOMAS McELROY*

The dismal lack of public participation in the market today reflects
the flight of the small investor, whose commitments in stocks have
resulted in too many losses. Recently Paul Kolton, President of the
American Stock Exchange, testified that there were about 800,000
fewer individual investors in listed securities in 1972 than in the previous year. One reason for this sharp drop in trading by the small
investor, Kolton said, was that the individual stockbroker had simply
become convinced that he did not trade in the market on equal terms
with large or institutional investors.' Any instrument to help bring the
public back into the market must therefore be seen to have a renewed
importance when securities exchanges no longer function in their quest
to raise equity capital for corporate expansion.
One of the strongest instruments available is Section 16(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.2 The introductory clause of section
16(b) shows that it was enacted "[flor the purpose of preventing the
unfair use of information which may have been obtained"8 by a corporate insider. But the statute by its terms does not require a showing of
the actual use of the information, fair or unfair, in order for profits to be
recoverable. As conceived by Congress, the statute was a hatchet, not a
scapel-a flat, blunt rule taking the profits out of a class of transactions
in which the possibility of abuse was considered unusually high. Thus it
* Member of White, McElroy, White, Sides & Rector, Dallas; Lecturer, Southern
Methodist University; B.A., Yale University; LL.B., University of Texas.
1. Deposition testimony of Paul Kolton, in Shumate & Co. v. American Stock
Exch., Civil No. 3-4708-D (N.D. Tex., filed Apr. 22, 1971).
2. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1970).

3. id. (emphasis added).
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was aimed at protecting the public by preventing insiders from profiting
in securities on the basis of information not available to the general
market.4
In addition to section 16(b), other instruments of investor incentive
include the creation of a central market place, with full disclosure of all
transactions in all securities, and the elimination of all artificial barriers
to trading, such as Rule 394 of the New York Stock Exchange, which
requires that listed securities be traded only on the floor of the exchange
absent exceptional circumstances. These are beyond the scope of this
article. But in this broader spectrum, where the large demands of the
electronic stock market of the future must be met, section 16(b) has
limited utility because transactions legally may be structured to circumvent it. Yet it is still part of the arsenal at hand and should therefore
be examined.
The First 15 Years of Section 16(b)
In 1949 this writer published a study entitled, Automatic Disgorging
of Insider's Profits Under Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934.5 A review of the many cases since publication of that
paper suggests that a more appropriate title today would be, "A Lessthan-Automatic, Pragmatic, Subjective Disgorging of Insider's Profits
under Section 16(b)." In 1949, 15 years after passage of the Act, there
were only 13 reported cases under section 16(b). The first and most
important of those cases was Smolowe v. Delendo Corp." This case
disposed of the contention that to compel a defendant to disgorge his
profits without proof that he took unfair advantage of his position would
be to deprive him of his property without due process of law. It was
argued that a proper construction of the statute would not strike down
good-faith transactions within six months and at the same time leave
untouched bad-faith transactions extending over a longer period. The
court, in answering this objection, pointed out that the framers of the
Act considered an objective or automatic standard of proof necessary for
an effective remedy, since the burden of proving an intent at the time of
purchase to sell within six months would ordinarily be too difficult.
"Bona fide transactions, too," the court said, "may be caught in the net
of the law. But what it legitimately struck at is the tendency to evil in
other cases." 7
4.
5.
6.
7.

S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1934).
27 TExAs L. REv. 840 (1949).
136 F.2d 231 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 751 (1943).
Id. at 240.
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INSIDER PROFITS
LANDMARK: BLAU V. LEHMAN

At the time of the 1949 study there were no Supreme Court cases for
review, and in fact nearly 28 years were required for the first case under8
the Act to make it all the way to the highest tribunal. Blau v. Lehman,
in the dissenting words of Mr. Justice Douglas, substantially eliminated
"the great Wall Street trading firms" from the prohibitions of section
16(b). Such result followed, in the view of the dissent, because so many
partners of investment banking firms served as directors of major corporations, and indeed Lehman Brothers, defendant in the case, was shown
to have partners on 100 boards of large companies. Under the holding
of the majority, Douglas felt, Lehman Brothers could make "a rich
harvest" on inside information because each partner need disgorge only
his distributive share of his firm's profits on confidential information,
with the other partners keeping the balance. "This," he wrote, "is a
mutilation of the Act."9
For the dissent the solution was to make the partnership a "director"
for purposes of section 16(b).' ° Indeed, under other provisions of the
Act, reference is made to a person who is a director, and the word
person is defined to include a partnership. The majority opinion held
that the definitions in the Act merely meant that a partnership could be
treated as an entity under the statute, not that it would be, and that no
reason at all was afforded for construing the word "director" in section
16(b) as though it read "partnership of which the director is a member." The majority therefore refused to render judgment against the
Lehman partnership, or the one Lehman partner who was a director of
the corporation upon whose behalf recovery was sought, for the $98,686.77 profits the partnership was found to have realized from its shortswing stock transactions. Recovery was only allowed against the partner
individually for $3,893.41, representing his distributive share of the
partnership gain.
The majority is not altogether persuasive in arguing that the broadening of the categories of persons on whom the liabilities of section 16(b)
are imposed was considered and rejected by Congress when it passed the
8. 368 U.S. 403 (1962).
9. Id. at 415.
10. Id. at 415-16. In the recent case of Simon v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner
& Smith, Inc., 482 F.2d 880 (5th Cir. 1973) the court refused to treat a brokerage house
as an insider, even though it owned 27.4% of the outstanding common stock of Scientific
Controls Corp. The brokerage house held the stock in the street name for the benefit
of its customers, rather than in an investment account.
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Act. It is true that drafts of provisions that eventually became section
16(b) would have made all profits received by anyone, whether an
insider or not, recoverable by the company, providing unlawful disclosures had been made. But the proper question before the Court in Blau
v. Lehman was simply whether a partnership could be a "director"
within the meaning of the statute. Therefore, there is some merit to the
dissent, which complained that:
We forget much history when we give Section 16 a strict and
narrow construction ...
What we do today allows all but one partner to share in the
feast which the one places on the partnership table. They in turn
can offer feasts to him in the 99 other companies of which they are
directors. . . . This result is a dilution of the fiduciary principle
that Congress wrote into Section 16 of the Act. It is, with all
respect, a dilution that is possible only by a strained reading of the
law. Until now, the courts have given this fiduciary principle a
cordial reception. We should not leave to Congress the task of
restoring the edifice that it erected and that we tear down."
Two other cases have reached the Supreme Court, both closely
decided and controversial. Three Justices dissented in each, and each
time Mr. Justice Douglas wrote a dissenting opinion arguing for applicability of the statute to require the disgorging of profits.
RELIANCE ELECTRIC AND THE TWO STAGE SALE

In Reliance Electric Co. v. Emerson Electric Co.," the majority held
that an investor can structure his transactions in a stock with intent of
avoiding liability and thus escape the reaches of section 16(b). Emerson
Electric Co. acquired 13.2 percent of the outstanding common stock of
Dodge Manufacturing Co., pursuant to a tender offer made in an
unsuccessful attempt to take over Dodge. This stock was bought at a
price of $63 per share. Shortly thereafter the shareholders of Dodge
approved a merger with Reliance Electric. Emerson, having been
blocked in its attempt to take over Dodge, then followed a plan recommended by its general counsel to dispose of its shares with as little
liability as possible. It therefore sold 37,000 shares of Dodge to a
brokerage house at $68 per share, reducing its holdings in Dodge to
9.96 percent of the outstanding common stock. Two weeks later Emerson then sold its remaining shares directly to Dodge at $69 per share.
11. Blau v. Lehman, 368 U.S. 403, 419-20 (1962) (dissenting opinion).
12. 404 U.S. 418 (1972).
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Reliance made demand on Emerson for profits realized from both sales,
and Emerson then filed a declaratory judgment action to adjudicate its
liability under section 16(b). The Supreme Court held that there was
liability under the first sale, when Emerson was an insider being more
than a 10 percent shareholder, but no liability under the second sale
when Emerson had reduced its holdings below the 10 percent requirement.13 In reaching its decision, the Supreme Court said that it was
following the mandate of Congress in applying a flat or mechanical rule
capable of easy administration. It rejected a construction of the statute
which would treat two sales as one upon proof of a pre-existing'attempt
by the seller that it had but a single plan of liquidation and merely split
its sales in order to avoid most of the potential liability under section
16(b).
Mr. Justice Douglas began his dissent by noting that Emerson had
made a profit exceeding $900,000, and that the majority was permitting
Emerson not to account, under the statute, for the greater part of its
gains. In his view, the "result is a mutilation of the Act, contrary to its
broad remedial purpose, inconsistent with the flexibility required in the
interpretation of securities legislation, and not required by the language
of the statute itself."' 4 The dissent argued that in the guise of an
objective approach the majority was undermining the statute:
By the simple expedient of dividing what would ordinarily be a
single transaction into two parts-both of which could be performed on the same day, so far as it appears from the Court's
opinion-a more-than-10% owner may reap windfall profits.',
Such a result was clearly against congressional intent and the Court
"should hold that there was only one sale-a plan of distribution
conceived 'at the time' Emerson owned 13.2 percent of the Dodge stock,
and implemented within six months of a matching purchase."' 6 Moreover, the dissenters would presume any split sale by a 10 percent owner
to be part of a disposition plan.
It was pointed out in the dissent that a tender offer, although it may
be described as a series of discrete purchases, has been treated as a
single purchase, citing Abrams v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 7 and in
the early cases under section 16(b) use of a mechanical or arbitrary
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
323 F.

426.
428.
431.
432.
Supp. 570 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), rev'd, 450 F.2d 157 (2d Cir. 1971).
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standard in determining its applicability ordinarily resulted in liability
against the insider. Here, however, an opposite effect was achieved.
The dissent further criticized the majority for its reasoning that to
treat "two sales as one upon proof of a pre-existing intent by the seller"
eroded the "mechanical quality" of the statute. 18 Indeed, Douglas wrote,
the "mechanical quality" was illusory, in that there is no rule so objective or automatic that it does not require some mental effort in applying
it. The better rule, in order not to defeat the avowed objective of section
16(b), would be for federal courts to resolve "all doubts and ambiguities against insiders."' 9 Unquestionably, the majority opinion will serve
to weaken the preventive purposes of 16(b), a result which could
logically have been avoided in Douglas' words by merely construing the
statute as allowing a rebuttable presumption that any such series of
dispositive transactions be deemed part of but a single plan of disposition, to be treated as a single "sale" for the purposes of section 16(b).
PRAGMATIC DISGORGING: KERN COUNTY LAND CO.

The following year the Supreme Court seemed to abandon the mechanical or objective approach it had just adopted in Reliance Electric
by determining that an exchange was not a sale and that a profit of more
than $19 million on shares obtained through a tender offer was therefore not recoverable under section 16(b). In Kern County Land Co. v.
Occidental Petroleum Corp.,' ° the latest 16(b) case to reach the Court,
a take-over attempt by Occidental of Kern County was blocked when
Kern was able to negotiate a defensive merger with Tenneco, Inc.
Fearing that the Kern stock it had acquired by tender offer would then
cause it to be locked in a minority position in Tenneco, Occidental
negotiated an arrangement whereby Tenneco was granted an option to
purchase all of the Tenneco preference stock to which Occidental was
entitled in exchange for its Kern stock, when and if the Kern-Tenneco
merger was closed. The question before the Court was whether a "sale"
within section 16(b) took place either when Occidental became irrevocably bound to exchange its shares of Kern for shares of Tenneco, or
when Occidental gave an option to purchase the Tenneco shares so
acquired. The majority concluded that a sale had not occurred for the
reason that it was,
18. Reliance Elec. Co. v. Emerson Elec. Co., 404 U.S. 418, 435 (1972).
19. Id. at 436, citing Blau v. Oppenheim, 250 F. Supp. 881, 884-85 (S.D.N.Y.
1966).
20. 411 U.S. 582 (1973).
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totally unrealistic to assume or infer from the facts before us that
Occidental either had or was likely to have access to inside information, by reason of its ownership of more than 10% of the outstanding shares of Old Kern, so as to afford it an opportunity to
reap speculative, short-swing profits. 2 '
This statement of the highest Court is a far cry from the approach
followed in Smolowe v. Delendo,2 2 and indeed from the language of the
same Court just one year earlier in Reliance Electric. In a footnote to
the majority opinion, recognition was given to "several decisions" applying a so-called objective test in interpreting and applying section
16(b), 23 among them the Smolowe decision. Under the objective or
mechanical approach, section 16(b) is held to be applicable whether
or not the transaction in question could possibly lend itself to the types
of speculative abuse that the statute was designed to prevent. The
Court stated, however, that the greater weight of authority holds that
a pragmatic approach to section 16(b) will best accomplish the legislative purpose.
In his dissent Douglas wrote that the majority, "in resorting to an ad
hoc analysis of the 'possibility for the speculative abuse of inside information,'" was charting a course for the interpretation of section 16(b)
that "undermines the congressional purpose." 24 By its own terms the
statute was applicable, irrespective of any actual or potential use of
inside information to gain a trading advantage. The dissenters concluded that it was inescapable that Occidental purchased and sold shares of
Kern within a six-month period and that this "round-trip" in Kern stock
should be covered by the literal terms of section 16(b).
The Supreme Court in Reliance Electric had stated that, "the only
method Congress deemed effective to curb the evils of insider trading
was a flat rule taking the profits out of a class of transactions in which
the possibility of abuse was believed to be intolerably great."2 " The
dissent in Occidental reasoned that it was one thing to interpret the
terms "purchase" or "sale" liberally in order to include transactions
within the ambit of the statute, but quite another to abandon the
26
mechanical test of the statute in order to relieve litigants of liability.
21. Id. at 596.
22.

136 F.2d 231 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 751 (1943).

23. Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental Pet. Co., 411 U.S. 582, 594 n.26 (1973).
24. Id. at 605.

25. Reliance Elec. Co. v. Emerson Elec. Co.,, 404 U.S. 418, 422 (1972) (emphasis

added).

26. Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental Pet. Co., 411 U.S. 582, 613 (1973).
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There is no doubt that the majority has left the approach of the Court
to section 16(b) cases less than clear by its waffling in two significant
cases decided within just one year of each other, and it is no surprise
that the dissent would complain in the Occidental litigation that it was
this "objective standard that the Court hung to so tenaciously in Reli27
ance Electric, but now apparently would abandon to a large extent."
Probably the best analysis of the three Supreme Court cases involving
section 16(b) is that Douglas and other dissenters will resolve all doubts
and ambiguities against insiders in order to hold section 16(b) applicable, while the majority, claiming now to follow the pragmatic test, will
actually determine each case on its own facts to achieve the desired
result.
FORTY-ONE YEARS OF SECTION

16 (b)

Since its enactment more than 40 years ago, there have been about
200 reported cases under section 16(b). The number of cases is probably no measure of the effectiveness of the law, however, its very existence serves, at least to some extent, as a deterrent to abuse of confidential information in stock transactions. Most corporate officers and
directors, and legal counsel advising them, know of the statute and seek
to avoid liability under it. The first 13 cases under the statute were
reviewed in the writer's 1949 survey. The next 153 or so reported cases
in the 21 year period until 1970 qualify, as aptly put by Louis Loss, as
having a "generalization-defying nature.' 2 Brief mention may, however, be made of a few of the more important cases decided during this
period.
In the majority's footnote in the Occidental case, citation was made to
Smolowe v. Delendo,'2 9 Park & Tilford v. Schulte,8 ° and Heli-Coil Corp.
v. Webster"' as cases in which the so-called "objective" test was applied
in interpreting section 16(b). In the Heli-Coil case, a corporation
brought suit against one of its directors to recover short-swing profits. It
was held that conversion of debentures into common stock at a time
when each debenture was the substantial equivalent of stock did not
constitute a realization of profit, but that sale of stock after conversion
was subject to the statute. While observing that the Act renders unprofit27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

Id. at 613.
5 L. Loss, SEcuRmEs REGULATION 3029 (Supp. 1969).
136 F.2d 231 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 751 (1943).
160 F.2d 984 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 761 (1947).
352 F.2d 156 (3d Cir. 1965).
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able short-swing speculations by insiders, the Third Circuit noted:
[Tirial courts and courts of appeals have taken two divergent roads
to what they deem to be the same end. One road leads out of Park
& Tilford; the other from Ferraiolo v. Newman. The test of the
first is very largely objective; the second, in part, at least, seems
subjective.3 Z
Ferraiolorests on the notion that "[e]very transaction which can reasonably be defined as a purchase will be so defined, if the transactionis
of a kind which can possibly lend itself to the speculation encompassed
by Section 16(b)."33 Since determination whether a transaction can
lend itself to speculation must be made by review of at least some facts,
the approach in Ferraiolo is deemed to be subjective or pragmatic.
Curiously, the author of Ferraiolo was Mr. Justice Stewart, the same
jurist who later wrote the majority opinion for the Supreme Court in
Reliance Electric, in which the Court was deemed to have returned to
the objective standard in the controversial "split-sale" case.
In Pettys v. Butler, 4 involving the question whether a conversion of
convertible preferred stock to common stock constituted a purchase
within the statute, the court held that an incorrect interpretation had
probably been placed on Park & Tilford and Heli-Coil, both of which
had been interpreted as requiring blunt application of section 16(b) to
all stock conversions without regard to the purposes of the Act. The
court stated that:
Since Park & Tilford, the Second Circuit has examined each
case on ad hoc basis to determine whether the transaction came
within the purpose of the Act. It specifically refused to be bound
by a 'black leather rubric' or a 'rule of thumb' as Park & Tilford
supposedly demanded."3
Blau v. Lamb 6 again recognized the two differences in approach in
determining applicability of section 16(b) to the question of whether a
conversion constituted a "purchase" or "sale." The court favored the
approach that required a determination of whether the transaction in
question could tend to accomplish what the Act was designed to prevent, that is, the unfair use of inside information for a short term profit.
32. Id. at 164; see Ferraiolo v. Newman, 259 F.2d 342 (6th Cir. 1958), cert. denied,
359 U.S. 927 (1959); Park & Tilford v. Schulte, 160 F.2d 984 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
332 U.S. 761 (1947).
33. Ferraiolo v. Newman, 259 F.2d 342 (6th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 927
(1959) (emphasis added).
34. 367 F.2d 528 (8th Cir. 1966).
35. Id. at 533.
36. 212 F.2d 82 (2d Cir. 1954).
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Similarly, in Roberts v. Eaton,17 it was observed that in a "growing
number of 16(b) precedents as to what constitutes a sale or purchase,
two lines of cases are gradually emerging, though the dividing line is as
yet somewhat shadowy." 3" One line was that leading from Park &
Tilford; the other came from Blau v. Mission Corp.3 9 and Shaw v.
Dreyfus.40 Also, in Blau v. Max Factor & Co.,4' attention was given to
the practices that section 16(b) was designed to prevent, in reaching the
result that the statute in that case was not applicable, despite the
arbitrary rule in conversion or exchange cases set by the Park & Tilford
line of cases.
DEPUTIZATION THEORY

In another interesting area of the law under the Act, the Second
Circuit in Feder v. Martin Marietta Corp.4 2 observed that the judicial
tendency had been to interpret section 16(b) in ways that were most
consistent with the legislative purpose, "even departing where necessary
from the literal statutory language.!' But even this policy of interpretation did not permit an expansion of the statute to persons other than
directors, officers and 10 percent shareholders, particularly in light
of Blau v. Lehman,4" where the Supreme Court had refused to hold a
partnership to be a director within the meaning of the statute. However,
by the creation of a legal fiction called the deputization theory, the
courts have managed to remain within the limits of section 16(b)'s literal language while expanding the reach of the Act. This fiction was
given its impetus in Rattner v. Lehman,4 5 where Judge Learned Hand,
in a concurring opinion discussing the question whether a partnership
is subject to section 16(b) liability whenever a partner is a director of
a corporation whose stock the partnership traded, stated:
I agree that § 16(b) does not go so far; but I wish to say nothing
as to whether, if a firm deputed a partner to represent its interest
as a director on the board, the other partners would not be liable.
True, they would not even then be formally 'directors;' but I am
37.

212 F.2d 82 (2d Cir. 1954).

38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Id. at 83.

45.

193 F.2d 564 (2d Cir. 1952).

212 F.2d 77 (2d Cir. 1954).
172 F.2d 140 (2d Cir. 1949).
342 F.2d 304 (9th Cir. 1965).
406 F.2d 260 (2d Cir. 1969).
Id. at 262 (emphasis added).
368 U.S. 403 (1962).
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not prepared to say that they could not be so considered; for
some purposes the common law does treat a firm as a jural person.46
The Supreme Court in Lehman was of the view that the issue of
deputization was a question of fact to be settled case by case rather than
a conclusion of law, but implicit in the decision was the availability of
the deputization theory to impose section 16(b) liability.4"
LOWER COURT CASES DURING THE PERIOD

1949-1969

Among the large mass of cases decided from 1949 through 1969
several other cases are worthy of note. Distinguishing between officers
and directors and 10 percent owners, the courts have determined the
difficult question of the time at which insider status attaches. As to the
former, the statute requires the office to be held at the time of both
purchase and sale.4 But liability for sales, while one is a director, has
been found even though the purchases occurred prior to the defendant's
assuming a directorship.4 9 In the same vein, liability has attached for
sales after termination of, directorship status where the purchases occurred while defendant was serving as a director.50 In Lee National
Corp. v. Segur5x it was held that an officer in a subsidiary of a corporation was not liable for short-swing profits in transactions in the stock of
the parent company. The circumstances indicated that the defendant's
officership in the subsidiary rather than the parent was not a subterfuge
for avoiding section 16(b). In Perfect Photo, Inc. v. Sentiff,52 the
purchase and sale of stock was held to be a short-swing transaction
resulting in liability to an insider under section 16(b) even though the
stock in question was not registered under a national securities exchange
until after purchase of the stock by the defendant. In Chemical Fund,
Inc. V. Xerox Corp., 3 the court rejected the contention that ownership
of more than 10 percent of an outstanding class of convertible debentures constituted the owner a beneficial owner of 10 percent of a class
of equity security. The test applied was the percentage of the underlying class of equity security which would be owned, assuming conver46. Id. at 567.
47. This was recognized in Marquette Cement Mfg. Co. v. Andreas, 239 F. Supp.
962 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
78
48. 15 U.S.C. § p (1970).
49. Adler v. Klawans, 267 F.2d 840 (2d Cir. 1959) (no liability under particular
facts); Blau v. Allen, 163 F. Supp. 702 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
50. Feder v. Martin Marietta Corp., 406 F.2d 260, 266 (2d Cir. 1969).
51. 281 F. Supp. 851 (E.D. Pa. '1968).
52. 205 F. Supp. 574 (E.D. Pa. 1962).
53. 377 F.2d 107 (2d Cir. 1967).
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sion, and in this case only 2.7 percent of the corporation's common
stock would have been owned if the debentures had been converted. 54
SECTION

16(b)

CASES SINCE

1970

Of the 30-odd section 16(b) cases to be reported since 1970, New-

mark v. RKO General, Inc.55 and Bershad v. McDonough5 6 are two of

the most interesting. Newmark first considered the threshold issue of
whether the purchase and subsequent exchange of Central Airline
shares by RKO, which at that time controlled Frontier Airlines, was the
type of transaction which section 16(b) was designed to prevent. The
court found "that RKO's heart may have been pure and its motivation
noble matters not."57 RKO's contract to purchase Central shares was the
"classic example" of trading while in the possession of information
unavailable to the general public. The prime question before the court
was whether the subsequent exchange of Central shares for Frontier
shares pursuant to a merger agreement constituted a "sale" of Central
securities for the purposes of the statute. In finding liability, the circuit
court disposed of the "economic equivalence" exemption established in
Blau v. Lamb."

The Second Circuit stated that section 16(b) was commonly termed
"a crude rule of thumb,"59 a description first employed by Thomas
Corcoran, spokesman for the drafters of the statute, during congressional hearings on the bill which ultimately became section 16(b).60 The
phrase now serves to describe not only the statute but also one approach
to its application, the so-called "objective" or "rule of thumb" approach,
wherein the statute is applied to all transactions which seem to fall
within its terms, without regard to whether imposition of liability would
further the purposes of the statute. This approach was rejected by the
Second Circuit in favor of the more "pragmatic" approach-applying
the statute only to those situations subject to speculative manipulation.
54. Id. at 110. The Securities Exchange Commission has announced that it does
not agree with the result reached in Chemical Fund, and will not follow it as regards
the reporting requirements of § 16(a). SEC Exchange Act Release No. 8202 (Dec. 6,
1967); 17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-2 (1975).
55. 425 F.2d 348 (2d Cir. 1970).
56. 428 F.2d 693 (7th Cir. 1970).
57. Newmark v. RKO Gen., Inc., 425 F.2d 348, 353 (2d Cir. 1970).
58. 363 F.2d 507, 523 (2d Cir. 1966).
59. Newmark v. RKO Gen., Inc., 425 F.2d 348, 350 (2d Cir. 1970).
60. Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Banking & Currency, 73d Cong., 2d

Sess. 6557 (1934).
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In Bershad v. McDonough,6 liability against the defendant insider
Bernard McDonough and wife was found in the amount of $612,000.
No doubt the defendants were mindful of section 16(b) and thought
they had structured their transactions safely beyond its grasp. They had
purchased 282,726 shares of Cudahy Company common on March 15th
and 16th, 1967. On July 20th the defendants and Smelting Refining &
Mining Co. entered into an option agreement granting Smelting the
right to purchase most of the Cudahy stock owned by defendants.
Exercise of this option did not occur until September 27, 1967, slightly
more than six months from time of stock purchase. But it was held
under the circumstances of the case that the "sale" of the Cudahy stock
should be dated as of the time of purchase of the option rather than its
exercise. Particular circumstances clearly indicated that the stock was
effectively transferred for practical purposes long before exercise of the
option, in that a $350,000 binder was paid for the option, an irrevocable
proxy was delivered to Smelting to vote the Cudahy shares, and the
defendant resigned as chairman of the board and was replaced by the
top officer of Smelting. In the text of its opinion the Seventh Circuit
reviewed many of the cases discussed herein and contrasted the approaches followed in interpreting the statute, and then in a footnote
stated:
We do not feel obliged to enter the debate over the 'objective'
versus 'pragmatic' approach which has consumed courts faced with
transactions that are apparently 'sales' but without risk of speculative abuses and insider profiteering. The 'pragmatic' approach
has never been extended to immunize transactions in which potential abuses of inside information can be seen. On the other
hand, the 'objective' or 'rule of thumb' approach need not compel
a court to wink at the substantial effects of a transaction which
is rife with potential sharp practices in order to preserve the easy
application of -the short swing provisions under Section 16(b) .2
The date of sale has been held to be the date of actual transfer rather
than the slightly earlier date of an underwriting agreement. 68 The
difference was not enough to save the defendant from section 16(b)
liability, but was used as the date for the purpose of computing recoverable profits. On the other hand, a district court held that the purchase
date was the date of a handshake agreement approved by the board of
directors of the seller rather than the date when the agreement was
61. 428 F.2d 693 (7th Cir. 1970).
62. Id. at 697 n.5.
63. Brenner v. Career Academy, Inc., 467 F.2d 1080 (7th Cir. 1972).
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reduced to writing.6 4 The court reasoned that the judiciary had shifted
from a rigid, objective interpretation of section 16(b) to a more subjective or pragmatic approach.6 5 Unfortunately, the appellate court did
not agree.6 6
Two other recent cases have reached the question of what constitutes
a purchase or sale under section 16(b). The Fifth Circuit held that the
exercise of an employee stock option was a purchase, the objective
standards of section 16(b) requiring this result. 67 Another court also
applied a strict standard when it deemed stock pledged as security for a
bank loan to have been "sold" by the insider-borrower. 8
InsiderRestrictions Under Rule 10b-5
No discussion of stock transactions by insiders can be complete
without assessing the impact of rule 10b-5;69 its trading consequences
were sharply adjudicated by the Second Circuit in Securities & Exchange Commission v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.70 This rule is based in
policy on the justifiable expectation of the securities market place that
all investors trading on impersonal exchanges shall have relatively equal
access to material information. 71 The Second Circuit found the rule
applicable to those "possessing the information who may not be strictly
72
termed an 'insider' within the meaning of Sec. 16(b) of the Act.
The court went on to say that anyone in possession of material inside
information must either disclose it to the investing public, or if disabled
from disclosing it in order to protect a corporate confidence, he must
abstain from trading in or recommending the securities concerned while
the inside information remains undisclosed. Yet an insider is not always
foreclosed from investing in his own company merely because he may be
more familiar with company operations than are outside investors.
64. Champion Home Builders Co. v. Jeffress, 352 F. Supp. 1081 (E.D. Mich. 1973),
rev'd, 490 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1974).

65. Id. at 1082.
66. Champion Home Builders Co. v. Jeffress, 490 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1974).
67.
68.
69.
70.

See Keller Indus., Inc. v. Walden, 462 F.2d 388, 390 (5th Cir. 1972).
Alloys Unlimited, Inc. v. Gilbert, 319 F. Supp. 617 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1975).
401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968).

71. In that case it was stated that:
The essence of the Rule is that anyone who, trading for his own account in the

securities of a corporation has 'access, directly or indirectly, to information intended
to be available only for a corporate purpose and not for the personal benefit of anyone' may not take 'advantage of such information knowing it is unavailable to those
with whom he is dealing,' i.e., the investing public.

Id. at 848.
72. Id. at 848 (emphasis added).
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An insider's duty to disclose information or his duty to abstain
from dealing in his company's securities arises only in those situations which are essentially extraordinary in nature and which are
reasonably certain to have a substantial effect on the market price
of the security if [the extraordinary situation is] disclosed.7"
An insider must be extraordinarily careful because he is charged with
the responsibility of strictly observing the provisions of the Act and must
bear the consequences for even an inadvertent miscalculation. Thus in
one Fifth Circuit case it was observed that the objective standards left no
room for inquiry into the question of the subjective intent of the insider
74
or even whether he was actually trading on the inside information.
Not surprisingly, complaints in some cases are couched in terms of
both rule lOb-5 and section 16(b) violations. Thus, in Lewis v. Adler, 75
the court held that the complaint did not state a claim under rule lob-5
because of a lack of sufficient allegations that the board of directors in
question had been deceived or that material information had been
withheld from it in connection with its grant of a stock option to an
employee. But the individual defendant was held liable for profit on
certain short-swing transactions, as exercise of his option was declared a
"purchase" under section 16(b).11
Similarly, in Levy v. Seaton,77 rule 10b-5 claims were dismissed as
insufficient, while section 16(b) allegations would not have resulted in
liability to the insider but for the absence of short-swing profit based on
the date on which the option in question was first exercisable, and not
the option price.
The greatest restriction on applicability of section 16(b) in coming
years, however, will undoubtedly' come not so much from a change of
approach to that statute as from increasing reliance on rule 1Ob-5, with
allowance of direct private actions, derivative actions, or both. Although
in Lewis and Levy, causes of action were found under section 16(b)
and not under rule 1Ob-5, allegations under 1Ob-5 will ordinarily afford
the broader coverage despite the 1Ob-5 standard requiring actual misuse
of inside information rather than the mere possibility of abuse under
16(b).
73. Id. at 848.
74. Keller Indus., Inc. v. Walden, 462 F.2d 388, 390 (5th Cir. 1972).
75. 331 F. Supp. 1258 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
76. Id. at 1266. The Fifth Circuit has also held the exercise of a stock option to
be a purchase. Keller Indus., Inc. v. Walden, 462 F.2d 388, 390 (5th Cir. 1972).
77. 358 F. Supp. 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
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CONCLUSION

The mechanical approach of determining applicability of section
16(b), sometimes resulting in "purposeless harshness" to the unsophisticated while failing to catch cunning insiders in its net, will no longer
ordinarily be followed. Instead, the courts will look to the question
whether the transaction could have lent itself to speculative abuse,
showing that in the past 26 years progress has been made to a more
reasonable, so-called "pragmatic" interpretation of the facts of each case
to determine whether or not liability should properly be found in light of
the plain purpose of the statute. What began as a simplistic, objective
standard or rule of law has sensibly evolved into the more flexible
standard of today.
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